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ORIGINAL AND DERIVED JUDGMENT:  
AN ENTREPRENEURIAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Recent work links entrepreneurship to the economic theory of firm using the Knightian 
concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. When judgment is complementary to other as-
sets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-functioning markets, it makes 
sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to 
arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. We extend this 
Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian un-
certainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners 
may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived 
judgment. We call these employees “proxy-entrepreneurs,” and ask how the firm’s or-
ganizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, 
rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating perform-
ance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that 
increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas 
from the entrepreneurship literature, Austrian economics, and the economic theory of 
the firm we develop a framework for analyzing the tradeoff between productive and de-
structive proxy-entrepreneurship. We link this analysis to the employment relation and 
ownership structure, providing new insights into these and related issues in the eco-
nomic theory of the firm.  
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1. Introduction 
Modern firms are increasingly encouraging entrepreneurship at all levels of the organization 
(e.g., Day and Wendler, 1998; Yonekura and Lynskey, 2002). To foster entrepreneurial attitudes 
and behavior managers must give significant discretion to employees. Delegated rights can, 
however, be used in both beneficial and harmful ways, presenting managers with a tradeoff be-
tween encouraging beneficial entrepreneurship and facilitating harmful entrepreneurship inside 
the firm. Building on key ideas from the economics of entrepreneurship (Knight, 1921; Casson, 
1982), Austrian economics (e.g., Hayek, 1945; Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973) and the theory of the 
firm (Coase, 1937; Holmström, 1979; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1996), we develop a framework 
for analyzing this tradeoff. We link this analysis to issues of the employment relation and asset 
ownership, arguing that our entrepreneurial perspective provides a fresh look on these classical 
issues in the economic theory of the firm.  
We begin with recent work linking entrepreneurship to the economic theory of the firm using 
the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment (Casson, 1982; Foss, 1993; Langlois and 
Cosgel, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2005). The foundation of this approach is the proposition that en-
trepreneurial judgment is costly to trade, an idea originally suggested by Knight (1921). When 
judgment is complementary to other assets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-
functioning markets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepre-
neur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. This 
role becomes particularly important in a dynamic economy where agents face unforeseen 
changes so that sequential decision-making, such as revising business plans that embody entre-
preneurial judgment, is necessary (Coase, 1937; Hayek, 1945; Williamson, 1996). Asset owner-
ship plays a critical role in facilitating the entrepreneurial revision of such plans. Thus, the exer-
cise of entrepreneurship is closely tied to resource ownership and the employment relation, pro-
viding a rationale for the existence of the firm.  
The claim that entrepreneurial judgment is manifested in ownership is straightforward for 
small firms with one or few owners. It is harder to see the entrepreneurial element in ownership 
within large, complex organizations with fragmented ownership and decentralized decision mak-
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ing.1 We argue that a type of Knightian entrepreneurship ⎯ what we term original judgment ⎯ 
is inseparable from resource ownership, and is exercised by owners even if they delegate most 
day-to-day decisions to subordinates. In firms with decentralized organizational structures, em-
ployees have considerable latitude, but as non-owners, their discretion is limited. In our frame-
work, employees holding decision authority can be described as “proxy entrepreneurs,” exercis-
ing delegated or derived judgment on behalf of their employers. Such employees are expected 
not to carry out routine instructions in a mechanical, passive way, but to apply their own judg-
ment to new circumstances or situations that may be unknown to the employer. This type of ar-
rangement is typically seen in the management literature as a form of empowerment, encourag-
ing employees to utilize the knowledge best known to them and giving them strong incentives to 
do so (e.g., Hill and Amabile, 1993; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Gagné and Deci, 2005). Such dis-
cretion is ultimately limited, because owners retain the rights to hire and fire employees and to 
acquire or dispose of complementary capital goods.2  
The precise manner in which employees’ discretion is limited is given by the firm’s organiza-
tional structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling 
disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance, and so on. Under some 
organizational structures, the employment relation is highly constrained, giving employees few 
opportunities to engage in proxy-entrepreneurship. In other firms the employment relation may 
be much more open. Granting such latitude to employees brings benefits and costs. As agents 
become less constrained, they are likely to engage in both “productive” proxy-entrepreneurship 
— activities that increase joint surplus — and “destructive” proxy-entrepreneurship, meaning 
activities that reduce joint surplus. One important function of contracts and organizational design 
is to balance productive and destructive proxy-entrepreneurship by selecting and enforcing the 
proper contractual constraints. The optimal organizational structure, in the Knightian perspec-
                                                          
1 While much of the modern entrepreneurship literature focuses on startups and sole proprietorships, it is striking 
that none of the major contributions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship — those of Schumpeter, Knight, 
Mises, Kirzner, and others — dealt specifically with small or new firms. 
2 To state the problem differently: decentralized decision rights and incentive compensation approximate the high-
powered incentives of private property and the price mechanism, but not perfectly (Foss, 2003). De facto discretion 
is not a perfect substitute for de jure discretion. We thus stand with Coase (1937), Williamson (1985, 1996), and 
Hart (1995) and against Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in seeing firm and market as 
alternative mechanisms for resource allocation, rather than simply different sets of contractual relations. 
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tive, is one that encourages employees to use derived judgment in ways that increase firm value 
while discouraging unproductive rent-seeking, influence activities, and other forms of proxy-
entrepreneurship that destroy value. The allocation of ownership rights and the characteristics of 
the employment relation thus matter for the efficient exercise of judgment. While not at variance 
with established approaches to the economic theory of the firm (e.g., Holmström, 1979; Hart, 
1995; Williamson, 1996), our approach goes beyond this literature.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining the judgment approach to entrepre-
neurship, linking it to resource ownership, and distinguishing between original and derived forms 
of judgment. Next we model, by means of a simple graphical example, the tradeoffs between 
destructive and productive derived judgment. We argue that ownership of assets is a means for 
an entrepreneur holding original judgment to implement his preferred extent of derived judgment 
in the firm. The overall contribution of this paper is show how the notion of entrepreneurship as 
judgment enriches the theory of economic organization. The Knightian approach to entrepre-
neurship, we argue, complements traditional approaches to the modern economic theory of the 
firm (i.e., moral hazard, the holdup problem) (Holmström, 1979; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1996; 
Kim and Mahoney, 2005).  
2. Judgment and Delegation  
2.1. Entrepreneurship as Judgment  
Foss and Klein (2005) show how the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm 
can be linked using the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. This view traces its origins to 
the first systematic treatment of entrepreneurship in economics, Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la 
nature de commerce en géneral (1755). It conceives entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making 
when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is gen-
erally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). More gener-
ally, judgment is required “when no obviously correct model or decision rule is available or when 
relevant data is unreliable or incomplete” (Casson, 1993). 
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As such, judgment is distinct from boldness, daring, or imagination (Begley and Boyd, 1987; 
Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996), innovation (Schumpeter, 1911), alertness (Kirzner, 1973), leadership (Witt, 
1998a, 1998b), and other concepts of entrepreneurship that appear in the economics and man-
agement literatures. Judgment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, as Knight (1921) 
emphasized, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures. Alertness is the ability to react to 
existing opportunities, while judgment refers to the creation of new opportunities.3 Those who 
specialize in judgmental decision-making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need 
not possess these traits. In short, decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it 
involves imagination, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 
Knight (1921) introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Judgment pri-
marily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events in situations in 
which the relevant probability distributions are themselves unknown.4 Entrepreneurship repre-
sents a particular form of judgment, one that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product 
and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight 1921: 311). Various reasons for this as-
serted non-contractibility are given in the literature. The “decisive factors,” Knight argues, “are 
so largely on the inside of the person making the decision that the ‘instances’ are not amenable to 
objective description and external control” (Knight, 1921: 251). Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that 
“entrepreneurship reveals to the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed, 
needed at all.” Casson (1982: 14) takes a more Schumpeterian position, arguing that “[t]he entre-
preneur believes he is right, while everyone else is wrong. Thus the essence of entrepreneurship 
is being different — being different because one has a different perception of the situation” (see 
also Casson, 1997; Demsetz, 1988). The implication of these arguments is that there is no market 
for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the per-
                                                          
3 In the treatment of Austrian economist Israel Kirzner , entrepreneurship is characterized as “a responding agency. I 
view the entrepreneur not as a source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that exist 
already and are waiting to be noticed” (Kirzner, 1973: 74). 
4 There is a long debate on whether Knightian uncertainty is meaningful, or whether “uncertainty” is simply highly 
subjective, and therefore not insurable, risks (e.g., Demsetz, 1988). We are agnostic on this issue, which does not 
seem to matter for our argument. Relatedly, it may be discussed whether Knightian uncertainty includes ignorance 
in the sense of unforeseen contingencies (Shackle, 1972; Littlechild, 1986; Williamson, 1996). Unforeseen contin-
gencies are important in our framework. 
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son with judgment to start a firm. Of course, entrepreneurs can hire consultants, forecasters, 
technical experts, and so on. However, in doing so they are exercising their own entrepreneurial 
judgment about whom to hire.  
2.2. Original and Derived Judgment 
Original judgment refers to the entrepreneurial formation and execution of a business idea. 
The idea may be anything from a loose, overall concept of how to combine inputs into outputs to 
a carefully specified, detailed business plan. A business plan involves the identification and co-
ordination of inputs and activities designed to make the business profitable. If the plan is highly 
detailed, the entrepreneur may delegate parts of its implementation to agents. However, in this 
case the entrepreneur will limit the employees’ entrepreneurial behavior as the essential actions 
to be taken are already laid out in the plan. If the entrepreneur recognizes a need for ongoing 
adjustment of the business plan, and wishes to take advantage of specific knowledge he himself 
does not possess, he will delegate the right to exercise derived judgment to employees.5  
The hierarchy of delegation may be deep and nested. Owners may choose to exercise original 
judgment directly, in the day-to-day management of assets, or to delegate some or all proximate 
decision rights to subordinates. Owners may be represented by a board of directors that decides 
which decision rights to delegate to managers, who exercise derived judgment over resource uses 
(and try to communicate such judgments to the board). Managers may then further delegate their 
own derived judgment rights to lower-level employees. As Knight (1921) argued, corporate gov-
ernance is a nested hierarchy of judgment. In an important sense, however, original judgment 
remains with the owner, because as a minimum, even the most “passive” owners must choose 
someone to manage the asset. As Rothbard (1962: 538) puts it:  
Hired managers may successfully direct production or choose production proc-
esses. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production rests inevitably 
with the owner, with the businessman whose property the product is until it is 
sold. It is the owners who make the decision concerning how much capital to in-
vest and in what particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must 
choose the managers. The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property 
                                                          
5 Note that the notion of “derived judgment” does not imply a subordinate position in economic or legal signifi-
cance; the notions of original and derived judgment are hierarchical (and temporal).  
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and the choice of the men to manage it must therefore be made by the owners and 
by no one else.6 
The claim that owners make the “ultimate” decisions about resource use does not imply that 
owners supply the complete content of the firm’s entrepreneurial plans. Instead, the owners, or 
the board of directors on behalf of the owners, may rely on plans and proposals developed by 
hired managers or outside consultants. In this situation, the board’s judgment consists of decid-
ing whether to commit resources to implement the business plan presented by the manager or 
consultant. In Fama and Jensen’s (1983) terminology, owners exercise decision control while 
delegating decision management to non-owners.  
 In large, complex organizations, judgment is delegated across many levels. As the success of 
the business plan likely depends on the actions of top managers, the board delegates considerable 
discretion to them. These managers in turn delegate discretion to their own subordinates, and so 
on throughout the organization. Thus, all levels below the owners exercise judgment that is de-
rived from the original judgment of the owners. For ease of exposition, in the following we focus 
on a simple model of a single entrepreneur-owner holding original judgment and an employee 
who can exercise derived judgment. This employee exercises derived judgment in the sense that 
he the entrepreneur delegates discretion to him but constrains his entrepreneurial activities, 
where the relevant constraints are derived from the original business plan and relate to, for ex-
ample, the type of activities and the means of coordination described in that plan.  
3. Derived Entrepreneurship: Productive and Destructive  
3.1. The Productive/Destructive Distinction 
 In most of the entrepreneurship literature, both in economics and in management, there is a 
general, though usually implicit claim that all entrepreneurial activity is socially beneficial (e.g., 
                                                          
6 Kirzner (1973: 68) argues similarly that entrepreneurial alertness cannot be fully delegated: “It is true that ‘alert-
ness” . . . may be hired; but one who hires an employee alert to possibilities of discovering knowledge has himself 
displayed alertness of a still higher order. . . . The entrepreneurial decision to hire is thus the ultimate hiring deci-
sion, responsible ni the last resort for all factors that are directly or indirectly hired for his project.” Kirzner goes on 
to quote Knight (1921: 291): “What we call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting some one else to do the ‘control-
ling.’” Unlike Knightian judgment, however, Kirznerian alertness can be exercised without asset ownership. For 
more on the contrast between Knight and Kirzner, see Foss and Klein (2005). 
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Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973; Yonekura and Lynskey, 2002; Shane, 2003). However, as Baumol 
(1990) pointed out, entrepreneurship may be socially harmful if it takes the form of rent-seeking, 
attempts to influence governments or management to redistribute income in a way that consumes 
resources and brings about a social loss. It is therefore necessary to introduce a distinction be-
tween productive and destructive entrepreneurship. This distinction applies in principle to both 
original and derived entrepreneurship. However, in the following we only consider the distinc-
tion in the context of derived entrepreneurship.  
For employees to exercise derived judgment they must have some discretion. When employ-
ees use their discretion to expend effort creating or discovering new attributes and taking control 
over these in such a way that value creation is reduced, we shall speak of “destructive entrepre-
neurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard (Holmström, 1979), creating holdups 
(Williamson, 1996), and inventing new ways of engaging in rent-seeking activities (Baumol, 
1990) are examples of destructive entrepreneurship. “Productive entrepreneurship” refers to the 
creation or discovery of new attributes that lead to an increase in value creation. For example, a 
franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn may form the basis for new products for the 
entire chain; an employee may figure out better uses of production assets and communicate this 
to the TQM team of which he is a member; etc. In the following we use this distinction to sketch 
an entrepreneurial approach to internal organization.  
As described above, we assume that employees, while not exercising the original judgment, 
exercise derived judgment through decision rights that are delegated to them. As proxy entrepre-
neurs, they make decisions about the use of resources owned by others.7 These decisions may be 
value-creating (productive) or value-destroying (destructive). Although original judgment cannot 
be assigned a marginal product, owners can form expectations about the costs and benefits of 
employees’ derived judgments.  
                                                          
7 Of course, to the extent that the proxy entrepreneur’s decisions affect the value of his own personal reputation, 
human capital, and so on, he is acting as an entrepreneur-owner, exercising original judgment with regard to these 
intangible, personal assets.  
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3.2. Managing Derived Judgment 
Many firms operates on the presumption that beneficial effects can be produced by giving 
them more rights to work with company assets, monitoring employees less, trusting them more, 
We shall use the terminology that this is a matter of “reducing constraints on employees” in vari-
ous dimensions. For example, firms such as 3M allocate time to research employees that they are 
basically free to use however they wish in the hope that this will produce serendipitous discover-
ies. Many consulting firms have adopted similar practices. Industrial firms have long known that 
employees with many decision rights — researchers, for example — must be monitored and con-
strained in different, and typically much looser, ways than those employees charged only with 
routine tasks. More broadly, the increasing emphasis on “empowerment” during recent decades 
reflects a recognition that employees derive a benefit from controlling aspects of their job situa-
tion (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Gagné and Deci, 2005). The total quality movement emphasizes 
that delegating various rights to employees motivates them to find new ways to increase the 
mean and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen and Wruck, 1994). To the extent that such ac-
tivities increase created value, they represent productive entrepreneurship.8 
Stimulating the productive creation and discovery of new asset attributes by reducing con-
straints on employees results in principal-agent relationships that are more open-ended because 
agents get opportunities to exercise their own, often far-reaching, judgments. However, reducing 
the constraints that agents face introduces potentially destructive proxy entrepreneurship. Man-
aging the tradeoff between productive and destructive proxy entrepreneurship thus becomes a 
critical management task.  
How can firms reduce the chance that derived judgment will be exercised in ways that are 
detrimental to the firm? In other words, how can destructive proxy entrepreneurship be mini-
mized? Firms may delimit employees’ use of assets, such as telephone and internet, by specify-
                                                          
8 Our notion of “more constrained” and “less constrained” employment relations includes, but is broader than, the 
notion of contractual completeness in the transaction cost literature (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1991; Crocker and 
Reyonlds, 1993; Saussier, 2000). Crocker and Reynolds (1993) define completeness as the probability that a contin-
gency not covered by prior contractual agreement arises. Under Knightian uncertainty, all contracts are incomplete, 
meaning that it is impossible to specify all contingencies ex ante. The firm’s organizational structure, governing the 
employment relation more broadly, can constrain employee opportunism even when formal contracts are highly 
incomplete in the Crocker and Reynolds sense.  
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ing their use rights over the relevant assets, instructing them to act in a proper manner towards 
customers, to exercise care when operating the firm’s equipment, and the like. However, firms 
are unlikely to succeed entirely in their attempt to curb such activities. Monitoring employees 
may be costly; moreover, employees may creatively circumvent constraints, for example by in-
venting ways to hide their behavior. Although firms may know that such destructive entrepre-
neurship takes place, they may prefer not to try to constrain it further. This is because the various 
constraints that firms impose on employees (or, more generally, that contracting partners impose 
on each other) to curb destructive entrepreneurship may have the unwanted side effect that pro-
ductive entrepreneurship is stifled (see Kirzner, 1985). More generally, imposing (too many) 
constraints on employees may reduce their propensity to create or discover new attributes of pro-
ductive assets within the limits set by the business plan.  
In this context, the employment relation and asset ownership are important because they give 
owner-entrepreneurs the rights and the ability to define formal and informal contractual con-
straints, that is, to choose their own preferred tradeoffs. Ownership by conferring authority al-
lows the employer-entrepreneur to establish his preferred organizational structure — and there-
fore a certain combination of productive and destructive entrepreneurship — at lowest cost. This 
function of ownership is particularly important in a dynamic world (Schumpeter, 1911; Kirzner, 
1973; Littlechild, 1986: D’Aveni, 1994), where the tradeoffs between productive and destructive 
entrepreneurship inside the firm are likely to change as the entrepreneur-owner revises his judg-
ment.  
3.3. An Example 
Consider a relation between two actors, Jack and Jill. Cooperation between Jack and Jill gen-
erates gains from trade because their services are complementary. Each can exercise either origi-
nal or derived judgment. Assume that the relation is an employment relation and that it involves 
the use of an asset. The relation is only productive if the asset is used (cf. our earlier remarks on 
judgment and asset ownership). This asset has multiple attributes (Barzel, 1997), that is, multiple 
functions, uses, and characteristics. Given Knightian ignorance and uncertainty, Jack and Jill do 
not know all relevant present and future attributes of the asset. Instead, attributes must be discov-
ered, over time, as the asset is deployed in production. The relation can be organized so that Jack 
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is employer and Jill employee, or vice versa. The asset may be owned by Jack or by Jill. In this 
mini-economy (cf. Holmström, 1999), what allocation of ownership and assignment of roles of 
employer and employee maximizes value?  
The employer exercises original judgment by conceiving and implementing a business plan. 
The employee exercises derived judgment in executing all or elements of that plan. The em-
ployer puts the plan in place by instructing and monitoring the employee in accordance with the 
plan; for example, by monitoring whether the employee maintains the value of the business plan 
by keeping the required quality levels of the product or service, physical assets, suppliers, etc. 
The employer not only forms original judgment, but also revises the business plan in the course 
of the relation as he discovers new uses of the assets in the project. As the employee is also 
equipped with entrepreneurial abilities; (s)he may discover hitherto undiscovered attributes of 
the asset in the relation. Some of these discoveries will add to the value of the business plan, 
either by adding elements to the plan or increasing the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
plan. For example, in a restaurant chain, the discovery by a local manager of a new dish may add 
value to the overall chain.  
 The employment relation is constrained in several dimensions. There are limits to what the 
employee can do, as well as when, how, with whom, etc. In other words, the decision (property) 
rights held by employee are circumscribed by the employer (cf. Jones, 1983). The number, 
scope, and character of such constraints are choice variables (imposing them on the employee 
obviously requires bargaining power; we deal with this later). The employer may issue more or 
less detailed instructions. At one end of the spectrum, the employer instructs the employee about 
everything; no scope is left for derived judgment. At the other end, the employee has very con-
siderable discretion; he has virtually full scope for exercising his derived judgment. Here we use 
the terminology that the relation can be made more or less “incomplete.”9 Less complete rela-
tions are those that give the employee more discretion. To abstract from enforcement issues 
(which are well treated in the modern economic theory of the firm) we assume that all the con-
straints that the employer specifies can be costlessly enforced, once implemented. What may 
                                                          
9 As described above, we have in mind a broader notion of “completeness” than what is found in modern contract 
theory. 
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require bargaining power, however, is the implementation of the employer’s preferred con-
straints.  
3.4. Value Creation as a Function of Entrepreneurship 
A suggested above, there are costs as well as benefits associated with the relaxation of em-
ployment constraints, and, hence, an optimum level of incompleteness that is larger than zero. 
The diagram depicted in Figure 1 maps Jack and Jill’s expectations (we assume these coincide) 
with respect to the effect on firm value of the employee’s productive and destructive proxy en-
trepreneurship as functions of the incompleteness of the relation when combined with the em-
ployer’s original judgment, as embodied in the business concept. The tradeoff may be regulated 
by means of the constraints that are placed on the employee, for example, by determining the 
budgets to which employees have access (Jensen and Meckling 1992), the activities they can en-
gage in (Holmström, 1989), the people with whom they can work (Holmström and Milgrom 1990), 
the type of equipment to which they have access, and how they are allowed to operate that equip-
ment (Barzel 1997).10 Such specifications of decision rights are simultaneously specifications of 
incompleteness. To simplify, one may think of “the degree of incompleteness” in terms of the 
time that the employee is allowed to use corporate resources (including their own work time) to 
conduct “research,” that is, activities that are not directly prescribed by the employer-owner, as 
in the above example of 3M allowing their research personnel very considerable discretion.  
________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
________________________ 
The P-curve then shows the benefits that may result from such productive proxy entrepre-
neurship as a function of the free time the agent is given. The P-curve thus maps those new dis-
coveries of the employee that when implemented complements the employer’s original judg-
ment. The claim is that, as the employee is given more freedom, there is a greater probability that 
                                                          
10 For example, regulating with whom an employee is allowed to interact clearly influences destructive as well as 
productive entrepreneurship; on the one hand, it may lead to destructive collusion among agents (as in Holmström 
and Milgrom, 1990), on the other hand it may lead to the generation of new ideas as the TQM literature emphasizes 
(Jensen and Wruck, 1994). 
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he will discover more beneficial attributes of the productive asset he operates. For example, the 
probability increases that he may discover new ways of making the asset more effective or new 
markets to which the asset’s services may be deployed. The relation between total benefits and 
more free time is a strictly concave one. The decreasing marginal returns from new discoveries 
may be caused by the increasing difficulties of implementing the new discoveries, given that the 
employer and the employee are constrained in terms of the time that is available for productive 
activities. Alternatively, the employee’s attention is more focused on making valuable discover-
ies when he has less free time than when he has more. 
Because of differential entrepreneurial capabilities, and the complementarities between Jack 
and Jill’s judgments, it matters for the joint monetary surplus from the relation who assumes the 
role of employer the principal and who is the agent (and as we argue later, who owns the asset). 
As drawn in the figure, joint monetary surplus is higher when Jill is employee and Jack is em-
ployer.  
However, there are also costs to giving the employee more free time for discovery, namely 
destructive entrepreneurial activities. The D-curve shows the costs from destructive proxy entre-
preneurship as a function of the free time the employee is given.11 The claim is that as the em-
ployee is given more freedom, there is a greater probability that he will discover new ways of 
destroying value. For example, the probability increases that he may discover new ways of mis-
using equipment, engaging in wasteful new projects, etc. Thus, with increased discretion over the 
multi-attribute asset, the employee will discover more new ways of controlling attributes, which 
increases the employee’s own benefit, but reduces expected joint surplus.  
3.5. The Parties’ Preferred Constraints 
Although the different degrees of incompleteness represented differences in created value for 
the different teams (i.e., {Jack as employer, Jill as employee}, {Jill as employer, Jack as em-
ployee}), we cannot identify the preferred points of the parties until we have taken full account 
of their’ costs and benefits, that is, their opportunity costs and the way in which they share the 
joint monetary surplus from the relation.  
                                                          
11 Of course, one may not envision only different P-curves but also different D-curves.  
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With respect to the employee, we assume that she realizes relationship-specific private bene-
fits (i.e., a non-transferable utility) of engaging in entrepreneurial activities and that this provides 
her sufficient motivation.12 Because of these benefits, the employee suffers opportunity costs of 
being constrained.  
The AO curve in figure 1, assumed to be linear, represents the employee’s opportunity costs 
of being constrained. These costs are inversely related to the degree of incompleteness. The em-
ployer suffers opportunity costs (the PO curve) of letting the employee exercise judgment by 
spending work time and other corporate resources on activities that may lead to discovery, be-
cause such resources could have been spent on routine activities. We assume that these costs are 
a linear function of the time given to the employee. Both parties share the monetary joint surplus 
in some proportion. We can assume, as is conventional, that they share 50:50. The employee’s 
total benefits are thus the sum of her share of the joint surplus plus her private benefits, while the 
employer’s net benefits are simply his share of the surplus minus his opportunity costs. Given the 
way these curves have been drawn, the team that maximizes net created value (monetary) is the 
one where Jack is employer and Jill is employee.  
________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 Here  
________________________ 
Given the specification of costs (including opportunity costs) and benefits in Figure 1, Figure 
2 shows the preferred constraints of the parties. Figure 2 depicts a curve, Esurp., which repre-
sents the employer’s share of the created value (minus his opportunity costs)13 and a curve, 
esurp. which represents the employee’s share of the surplus plus her private benefits.14 Given 
this, the employer’s preferred degree of contractual incompleteness is given by I*E and the em-
ployee’s is given by I*e. Thus, the parties disagree about how many constraints should be im-
                                                          
12 Aghion and Tirole (1997) make a similar, clearly heroic, assumption. As justification, one may point to the fact 
that the ability of more or less freely dispose over a certain percentage of one’s working hours has become an in-
creasingly part of many employment packages, particularly in “dynamic” industries (IT, biotech, consulting, etc.).  
13 More precisely, the employer receives Esurp. = ½ (P−D). 
14 More precisely, the employee receives esurp. = ½ (P−D) + (k−AO), where k represents the value of AO when 
incompleteness is zero.  
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posed upon the employee! The parties may strike any contract between I*E and I*e (this will al-
ways be beneficial compared to a situation of no contract). However, given the assumption that a 
part of the employee’s total benefits and the employer’s costs are private, bargaining is likely to 
be costly and dissipate value.  
In fact, as the example is constructed, no sharing rule can generate agreement on the pre-
ferred degree of contractual incompleteness, and any sharing rule will therefore cause some inef-
ficiency. Moreover, according to Figure 2, it is more lucrative to be an employee than to be a 
principal, which may imply that the party who holds comparative advantages in forming original 
judgment (i.e., Jack in figure 1) may prefer to be an employee with the party who is compara-
tively disadvantaged in forming original judgment as a employer (i.e., Jill in figure 1). This is 
clearly inefficient: As the example has been constructed, the team in which Jack is employer and 
Jill is employee is more efficient (it creates more value) than the other team.  
In a zero transaction cost world, this inefficiency may be handled through the appropriate 
choices of sharing rules, bribes, and contractual constraints (Coase, 1960). However, bargaining 
costs may swamp the benefits from such arrangements (Wernerfelt, 1997). Given bargaining 
costs, it matters who sets sharing rules and contractual constraints. If, for example, the employee 
can set the constraints but cannot bribe the principal, not even 100 % residual claimancy will 
make it attractive to become employer, since in this case, the agent will prefer total absence of 
constraints, which in turn means that joint monetary surplus will be zero (and the employer still 
has to suffer the opportunity costs of the employee’s entrepreneurial activities). The question 
then is how these inefficiencies are minimized, that is, choosing the efficient team (i.e, team 
{Jack is employer, Jill is employee} or {Jill is employer, Jack is employee}), sharing rules and 
contractual constraints. We argue that ownership to the asset in the relation plays a key role with 
respect to all three issues.  
4. Asset Ownership  
4.1. Ownership Facilitates Entrepreneurship 
Ownership plays a key role in easing entrepreneurship and exchange (i.e., minimizing costs 
of dissipation). Asset ownership confers a bundle of rights, including rights to hitherto unknown 
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attributes of the relevant asset. Ownership reduces information, communication, and contracting 
costs relative to a situation in which it was necessary to contract over all these rights. Thus, own-
ership eases the implementation of entrepreneurial judgment in a productive venture by allowing 
entrepreneurs to acquire, in one transaction, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a distinct asset). 
This means that the parties do not have to engage in costly bargaining over many rights to single 
attributes (Barzel, 1997). The dissipation of value is at a minimum. Moreover, ownership also 
facilitates the use of entrepreneurial judgment in a productive venture by conferring a legally 
recognized right to define contractual constraints (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1996).  
Recall now the possible inefficiency caused by the individual with comparative advantages in 
forming original judgment (here, Jack) wishing to assume the role of employee and being di-
rected by the comparatively disadvantaged individual (here, Jill) because this would give him 
higher returns. This inefficiency may be avoided if somehow Jack can be made just as well off as 
employer in the efficient team as employee in the inefficient team. Simply adjusting the sharing 
rule with respect to the monetary surplus to compensate Jack will not do: If Jack receives, for 
example, 100% of the surplus, this will not compensate him, if Jill keeps the right to set the con-
straints. In fact, the greater the employer’s share in the surplus, the greater will be the em-
ployee’s incentive to choose constraints that maximizes his own private benefits at the cost of the 
joint monetary surplus.  
The power to set constraints is conferred by asset ownership. Thus, if the employer owns the 
asset, he can set constraints in such a way that he can influence the size of the surplus that will be 
shared among the parties, and in this way make sure that he will be actually be compensated for 
assuming the role of principal in the efficient team. In other words, ownership has the function in 
our example of minimizing the dissipation of value ⎯ it means that Jack and Jill do not have to 
engage in costly bargaining ⎯ and of selecting the efficient team, that is, the one that best util-
izes the parties’ comparative advantages in forming original and derived judgment. To put it in a 
compact manner, ownership is a means of implementing the principal’s preferred degree of in-
completeness in a low-cost way.  
Although we have presented our arguments in the context of a static setting, the above func-
tions of ownership are particularly important in a dynamic context, because in such a context an 
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ongoing process of entrepreneurial creation and discovery will require that constraints in a rela-
tion are redefined. Thus, in terms of Figure 1, the slopes of the D and the P curves are likely to 
change over time as a result of entrepreneurial activities on the part of both the agent and the 
principal. The power conferred by ownership allows the principal to adjust the level of contrac-
tual constrains to ensure that he has incentives to maintain the role of principal in the efficient 
team, realizing comparative advantages of entrepreneurship. Indeed, as noted below, the notion 
that contractual constraints define the scope of entrepreneurship, rather than simply allowing 
agents to choose the values of particular variables with known distributions, is an inherently dy-
namic, forward-looking concept of organizational design. 
4.2. Other Applications 
Our theory of ownership as a means of implementing a preferred set of constraints in a pro-
ductive relation, and therefore a certain combination of productive and destructive entrepreneur-
ship, has application beyond the determination of who should be the owner. It can also cast light 
over the more general issue of why a certain agent owns a certain asset, independent of his rela-
tionships with other agents. The theory of ownership presented in Hart (1995) revolves around 
the holdup problem: One should own those assets that are complementary to one’s (non-
contractible) human capital investments, since this increases (ex post) bargaining power and 
therefore the rents that may be expected from investments. This seems to be a less-than-general 
explanation: People own many things, the ownership of which cannot be explained by holdup 
considerations (e.g., standard kitchen utensils in a household).  
Another common idea is that those who discover new knowledge have an incentive to use it 
themselves because of the transaction costs of knowledge transfer. Given this, there is a general 
tendency for ownership of complementary assets to move to the knowledge source (rather than the 
other around), because knowledge is harder to trade than most other resources (Foss,1993; Casson, 
1997). The problem with this explanation is that it is does not allow to distinguish analytically be-
tween ownership and rental agreements. Our theory can do this, however. 
For example, suppose that a car rental company put very few constraints in the contracts they 
offer renters, so that the latter could use the company’s cars for the purpose of running a taxi busi-
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ness or a truck operation. Thus, the company does not much constrain productive and destructive 
proxy-entrepreneurship. In reality, however, a car rental company will normally prefer to circum-
scribe in a relatively detailed way the possible productive and destructive entrepreneurship that the 
renter can engage in. For example, usually rental cars cannot be used for commercial purposes, 
among other things because the company fears that the car will not be driven in a proper way, and 
that this will diminish the demand of other renters for the car’s services. Thus, in order to maintain 
demand and control externalities, the company constrains the use of the car in many ways. How-
ever, a renter who wishes to use a rental car for entrepreneurial, commercial purposes is not likely 
to find the constraints imposed by the car rental company to be optimal. Hence, he may prefer to 
own the car in order to be able to impose his own preferred way of using the car, that is, he owns 
the car in order to carry out his own entrepreneurial plans.15  
5. Conclusion  
5.1. Contribution to Theory 
In the entrepreneurial judgment approach, the theory of the firm becomes a theory of how the 
entrepreneur arranges his capital assets, including which combinations of assets he will seek to 
acquire and which assets he may later divest in an attempt to carry out the commercial experi-
ment that embodies his judgment (Knight, 1921; Casson, 1982; Foss, 1993; Langlois and Cosgel, 
1993; Foss and Klein, 2005). The present paper extends this approach by explaining how entre-
preneur-owners delegate decision rights to employees and how the employees’ exercise of de-
rived judgment is best circumscribed.  
 In established economic theories of organizational design, delegation is usually analyzed 
with a principal-agent model. Such models have been exhaustively treated in the literature. A 
basic implication of this apparatus is that more complete contracts are preferable to less complete 
contracts. However, if agents are allowed to exercise derived judgment, as in our approach, this 
conclusion changes. There is a positive level of incompleteness, not because complete contracts 
                                                          
15 Of course, in this situation car rental companies may increase earnings by offering differentiated products, where 
rental fees and contractual constraints differ for different segments of the market, or new firms may arise to special-
purpose segments of the market. However, even those firms that offer cars with fewer or other contractual con-
straints may be too constraining for some persons, particularly those who (expects that they) are likely to discover 
yet unimagined activities (i.e., entrepreneurs). They will still want to become owners. 
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are costly to draft (as in Crocker and Reynolds, 1993), but because complete contracts curb en-
trepreneurial activities, both productive and destructive. More generally, in the kind of open-
ended world envisaged by Knight (1921) as well as Austrian economists (Mises, 1949; Shackle, 
1972; O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985; Koppl and Minniti, 2003), limiting employee discretion in-
volves more than simply making formal, written contracts more complete. Discretion is con-
strained but organizational structure, which includes not only formal contracts, but also the com-
plementary elements of informal norms (“corporate culture” and other implicit contracts), offi-
cial and unofficial means for resolving disputes (Williamson, 1996), and so on. Ownership con-
veys the right to define key elements of this organizational structure.16 
Moreover, in contrast to the new property rights approach (Hart, 1995), ownership has broad 
implications for firm performance. In our approach, the arrangement of property titles affects not 
only ex ante relationship-specific investments (as in the new property rights approach). but also 
how the firm will perform through time (original judgment rights should be allocated to the party 
best able to exercise them); likewise, internal organization affects not only current performance 
(as in agency theory, mechanism design, etc.), but also dynamics — how derived judgment will 
be exercised through time. The judgment approach to organizational design is thus inherently 
dynamic. 
5.2. Implications for Future Research 
As already indicated, the approach of this paper is in some important ways different from the 
mainstream in the economic theory of the firm. Thus, we have sidestepped the issue of motivat-
ing the agent by means of explicit incentives by assuming that the agent realized a private benefit 
from having the freedom to engage in entrepreneurial activities that provide sufficient motivation 
for him to engage in these activities. This is not because we consider explicit incentives unimpor-
tant, but rather because we think the assumption that the agents can be (partly) motivated by be-
ing given more influence over their job situation is a realistic one (and a neglected one, too). In-
                                                          
16 We do not claim that the informal aspects of organizational structure are completely controlled, or “designed,” by 
owners. We certainly recognize that, for example, corporate culture can grow and evolve organically, that there is an 
element of “spontaneous order” within the firm. But we maintain that formal constraints, established and revised by 
owners, are the ultimate drivers of organizational form. 
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corporating explicit incentives into the analysis should provide additional insight into optimal 
organizational design, however. 
Our approach also suggests that existing studies of contractual completeness, by focusing 
narrowly on the presence or absence of certain clauses in formal, written contracts, may not ade-
quately capture the actual discretion possessed by parties in economic relationships. Agents may 
have substantial rights to exercise derived judgment even when they are subject to strong, formal 
contractual restrictions. This is because under Knightian uncertainty, the contracting space is 
always open-ended, so that new margins may be created or discovered over which agents may 
optimize their gains.17 To give our approach empirical content, however, it is necessary to spec-
ify some observable proxies for derived judgment. It is unclear how such proxies could be identi-
fied in a large sample of firms, suggesting that case studies and quantitative analysis based on 
surveys of employee perceptions are necessary.  
Conceiving of owners as entrepreneurs has further implications for the economic theory of 
the firm. Our analysis has focused on the judgment rights delegated to employees and the impor-
tance of stimulating productive proxy-entrepreneurship. This does not imply, however, that we 
regard the entrepreneur-owner’s original judgment rights as purely formal and symbolic. On the 
contrary, we view owners — even corporate shareholders — as critical decision makers, not 
simply passive providers of capital.18 As such, their behavior belongs at the forefront of research 
on the economics of organization. For example, if owners are entrepreneurs, then the firm should 
be viewed not as a production process, a stock of knowledge, or a governance structure, but as an 
investment. The firm-as-investment literature (Gabor and Pearce, 1952, 1958; Vickers, 1970, 
1987; Moroney, 1972; Klein, 1999) challenges several aspects of conventional micro-economics, 
such as the claim that managers should expand output to the point where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost, rather than the point where the return on the last dollar of money capital is 
                                                          
17 See Foss and Foss (2000) for a discussion of how this heuristic contrasts with the conventional modeling approach 
in contract theory. Of course, in actual modeling, contracting spaces are somehow closed, because of the immense 
mathematical complexities of working with open spaces. Foss and Foss invoke the notion of an open contracting 
space as a feature of the interpretation and application of the model.  
18 These claims of course apply a fortiori to large blockholders, institutional investors, venture capitalists or angel 
investors in venture-backed firms, and other “active” investors or investment groups. 
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just equal to the opportunity cost of that last dollar of money capital.19 The firm-as-investment 
concept relates closely to an emerging literature on merger as a form of firm-level investment 
(Bittlingmayer 1996; Andrade and Stafford 2004).  
Finally, we note some implications of our perspective for ongoing work in the tradition of 
Austrian economics. Much of the contemporary Austrian literature focuses on the organic, 
“spontaneous” nature of market exchange, the distribution of tacit knowledge (Hayek, 1945), and 
the failure of top-down, central planning (Mises, 1920). However, in our view, the emphasis on 
“market” over “hierarchy” (to use Williamsonian terms) has resulted in a lack of attention to 
organizations, the ubiquitous, central features of all modern economies (Simon, 1990).20 In 
Foss’s (2001) terminology, even in “Hayekian settings” there is a role for “Misesian ownership” 
and “Coasian authority.” We hope the analysis presented in the present paper encourages further 
research in the Knightian and Austrian traditions on the functions of ownership, authority, and 
delegation within firms and other organizations.  
 
 
                                                          
19 If the firm is earning positive net returns at its current level of output, instead of increasing output until marginal 
net returns fall to zero, the firm could simply take those returns and employ them elsewhere, either to set up a new 
firm in the same industry or to diversify into a new industry (Gabor and Pearce 1952: 253). The efficient scale of 
production is determined by outside investment opportunities, not simply the marginal returns from producing a 
single output.  
20 An obvious exception is Mises (1944). 
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Figure 2: The Parties’ Preferred Degree of Incompleteness
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